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Abstract 
Strategic alliances attempt to create a cooperative association between two or more 
firms to share resources such as product design, production, marketing or distribution. 
Alliances can be used to avoid the rigidity of some organisational forms, such as 
mergers and takeovers, and to gain access to knowledge and skills otherwise not 
available.  
Despite the rapid growth in the formation of alliances, event studies of stock 
returns surrounding the announcement of strategic alliances are not common. This 
study seeks to add value to the existing literature by linking together theoretical 
models of strategic alliances with an empirical examination of stock returns on the 
announcement of strategic alliances.  
Using a sample of 123 strategic alliance announcements the results find strong 
support for the hypothesis that strategic alliance announcements generate significant 
positive abnormal returns on the announcement day. Although strategic alliances are 
more prevalent in the higher technology industries the source of the abnormal stock 
returns is a sub-sample of firms with lower market to book values.  This is found to be 
supportive of the hypothesis that the announcement of a strategic alliance is additional 
information for firms with lower growth. There is no empirical support for the 
knowledge, flexibility and the hubris hypotheses. 
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The source of abnormal returns from strategic alliance announcements 
 
 
Abstract 
Strategic alliances attempt to create a cooperative association between two or more 
firms to share resources such as product design, production, marketing or distribution. 
Alliances can be used to avoid the rigidity of some organisational forms, such as 
mergers and takeovers, and to gain access to knowledge and skills otherwise not 
available.  
Despite the rapid growth in the formation of alliances, event studies of stock 
returns surrounding the announcement of strategic alliances are not common. This 
study seeks to add value to the existing literature by linking together theoretical 
models of strategic alliances with an empirical examination of stock returns on the 
announcement of strategic alliances.  
Using a sample of 123 strategic alliance announcements the results find strong 
support for the hypothesis that strategic alliance announcements generate significant 
positive abnormal returns on the announcement day. Although strategic alliances are 
more prevalent in the higher technology industries the source of the abnormal stock 
returns is a sub-sample of firms with lower market to book values.  This is found to be 
supportive of the hypothesis that the announcement of a strategic alliance is additional 
information for firms with lower growth. There is no empirical support for the 
knowledge, flexibility and the hubris hypotheses. 
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The source of abnormal returns from strategic alliance announcements 
 
1. Introduction 
An alliance is an agreement between parties that is formed to advance common 
interests or causes in an attempt to achieve a particular aim. Alliances between firms 
can be used to avoid the rigidity of some organisational forms such as mergers and 
takeovers and to gain access to knowledge and skills otherwise not available. 
Alliances are generally cooperative associations between two or more firms to share 
their knowledge, experience and assets and to potentially create greater value. They 
can take many forms from simple agreements with no equity ties to more formal 
agreements involving equity ownership and share managerial control over joint 
activities. This study focuses on alliances that agree to pool resources and documents 
results of analysis of the stock market response to a sample of strategic alliance 
announcements. Furthermore, the study identifies the source of abnormal returns that 
accompany such announcements.  
Three main theoretical arguments are suggested for the source of abnormal 
share price reaction when a firm announces a strategic alliance. Strategic alliances 
may be more cost effective than other organisational re-structures in obtaining access 
to specialised knowledge. Strategic alliances may improve organisational flexibility 
and/or signal to the market improved investment opportunities. Although the existing 
literature provides theoretical support for the source of abnormal returns, very little 
evidence has been documented on whether abnormal returns occur on the 
announcement of a strategic alliance and the source of those abnormal returns. The 
aim of this paper is to help fill that void. This study seeks to add value to the existing 
literature by linking together theoretical models of alliances with an empirical 
examination of stock returns surrounding strategic alliance announcements.  
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The remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature and develops the hypotheses that will be tested. Section three overviews the 
data collection process and the characteristics of that data and outlines the methods 
used to test the data. The results of the tests are documented in section four and 
section five summarises the manuscript.  
 
 
2. Hypothesis Development  
The main hypothesis is whether the announcement of a strategic alliance generates 
positive abnormal returns to shareholders.  In other words, is the announcement of 
strategic alliances regarded as unexpected good news for shareholders?  
Chan et al (1997) in a study of strategic alliance announcements in the US 
report significant announcement day abnormal returns of 0.64% and Gleason, Mathur 
and Wiggins (2003) report significant announcement day abnormal returns of 0.66% 
for strategic alliance in the US financial services industry. These studies suggest that 
the announcement of a strategic alliance is unexpected good news.  
The source of the abnormal returns from strategic alliance announcements is 
difficult to identify due to the interaction of many explanatory variables and to date 
there has not been any theoretical model that completely explains the origin of the 
abnormal returns. There are at least three possible sources of these abnormal gains; 
increased knowledge, increased flexibility and improved investment opportunities. 
These are discussed below. 
 
a. Knowledge Hypothesis 
According to the theory of optimal application of knowledge within 
organisations (Jensen and Meckling 1991), strategic alliances can be more cost 
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effective than mergers and acquisitions in knowledge transfer (Chan et. al, 1997). 
Knowledge can be classified as general or specific (Jensen and Meckling, 1991, 
Chesbrough and Teece, 1996).1  General knowledge is easier to transfer than specific 
knowledge. For example, the knowledge of a specialist is more difficult to transfer 
than knowledge of a non-specialist. Strategic alliances are a natural response to the 
difficulties faced when attempting to transfer specific knowledge (Jensen, 1993). The 
costs of knowledge transfer can be particularly high for projects involving new 
product creation, new technology development, or other highly innovative endeavours 
which often require substantial specialised knowledge (Chan et. al, 1997).  Pisano 
(1989) considers alliances that involve research and development to involve a greater 
degree of transaction specific know-how than other alliances. Therefore, these types 
of alliances may offer participants greater value than other types of alliances that do 
not involve either specific or proprietary information. 
This suggests that a source of gains is the increased specialised knowledge that 
the alliance will bring to the firm and this will be most evident in alliances that 
involve research and development.  
 
b. Flexibility Hypothesis 
Strategic alliances can add value to a firm through improved organisational 
flexibility. Chan et al. (1997, p.203) explains: 
“Since alliances do not create a new organisational entity they avoid the agency costs 
associated with managements reluctance to release resources  under their control once the 
need for those resources has gone away.”  
                                                 
1 Chesbrough and Teece (1996) use the terms ‘tacit’ and ‘codified’ to classify knowledge. 
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The flexibility to release resources has the direct result of more informed decisions 
being made more dynamically. Mody (1993) suggests that flexibility inherent in 
strategic alliances facilitates experimentation with new combinations of participants 
in the pursuit of new technologies or marketing strategies. The ability to experiment 
should be particularly valuable to rapidly growing firms and those in the higher 
technology industries where there is likely to be rapid changes. Studies on alliances 
by Mariti and Smiley (1983), TASC (1990) and Chan et al. (1997) have found a 
significant proportion of alliances are higher technology in nature.  
An alliance has the characteristics of a call option, the option price is the 
initial outlay and the exercise price is the future investment required to advance the 
alliance. Should the alliance prove to be unsuccessful, the option does not have to be 
exercised. In more volatile markets an alliance, like an option, is more valuable. 
Therefore, strategic alliances should be more valuable in higher technology industries 
where future demand is uncertain.  
Chan et al. (1997) test high-tech alliances versus low-tech alliances and show 
that announcement day returns for alliances that relate to new technology create 
significant positive returns of 1.12% while announcements for low-tech alliances do 
not generate any significant announcement day returns. This implies alliances add 
more value when the risks are higher. Therefore, the source of gains to shareholders 
from strategic alliances accrue from the flexibility that the alliances provides and that 
this flexibility would be most evident for higher technology alliances. 
   
c. Investment Opportunity Hypothesis 
A firm with a good investment opportunity set is a firm with positive net present 
value projects available. To measure the ex-ante investment opportunities, ex post, the 
  7
ratio of market value (MV) to book value (BV) of the firm is often used. Firms with a 
high MV/BV are regarded as growth firms. Growth firms are firms where the market 
considers the firm to have positive net present value projects or growth opportunities. 
If a higher growth firm forms a strategic alliance then the market may see this as 
confirmation of the projects the firm is expected to have available.  This may not be 
regarded by the market as more information relative to a strategic alliance announced 
by a lower growth firm. If a lower growth firm announces a strategic alliance then this 
may signal to the market that the firm actually has growth opportunities, which have 
been previously undervalued. This is referred to here as the new information 
hypothesis. 
However, Roll (1986) proposes that managers of past good performing firms 
suffer from over confidence or ‘hubris’ and over value potential investments. The 
good past performance endows management with cash and with ‘hubris’. Burdened 
with overconfidence, management selects target investments (Roll suggests a target 
firm) and over estimates the value created investing in projects that are not value 
maximising.  The market is aware of this potential for over-investment and discounts 
the information. Therefore, if the hubris hypothesis holds a negative relationship 
between growth and returns to strategic alliance announcements is expected.   
If strategic alliance abnormal returns are smaller for high growth firms relative 
to low growth firms, then it is evidence that the alliance is new information rather 
than confirmation of existing information. However, if a smaller return for growth 
firms is found then this also supports the hubris hypothesis. A way of isolating out 
these two effects is to consider the level of free cash flow available to the firm. Firms 
that have higher levels of free cash flow will be more susceptible to hubris than firms 
with lower levels of free cash flow. The managers of the higher free cash flow firms 
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will be more likely to utilise those free cash flows in a non-maximising way. Firms 
that have higher levels of free cash flow and are higher growth firms are more likely 
to suffer from hubris relative to higher growth firms with lower levels of free cash 
flow.  Lower growth firms with lower levels of free cash flows are least likely to 
suffer from hubris. Therefore, if strategic alliance announcement day returns are due 
to new information then controlling for free cash flow will isolate the effect of hubris. 
If the returns are due to hubris, then controlling for growth will isolate the effect of 
new information.   
 
3. Data and Method 
a. Data 
The initial data set of strategic alliance announcements was obtained from the 
Aspect Financial Dat Analysis database. A ‘quick search’ was used to identify all 
companies making announcements containing the words ‘strategic’ and ‘alliance’ 
from June, 1994 to June 2001. This search retrieved 580 companies making 1,325 
strategic alliance announcements. 
To avoid price sensitive confounding events all strategic alliance 
announcements involving annual reports and half yearly summaries and other 
announcements within 60 days of the strategic alliance announcement were removed. 
This resulted in 579 announcements remaining. Of the remaining announcements 
each was carefully scrutinised and those not containing sufficient information on the 
formation of a strategic alliance were also removed, leaving 281 announcements. 
Further, 127 strategic alliances relating to subsidiaries were removed as the 
relationship between the parent and the subsidiary was available to the market and 
this is likely to be already regarded as an alliance.  Twenty eight announcements 
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relating to firms that were listed within the last 12 months were also excluded because 
of lack of sufficient data for beta estimation. 
A further removal of data points arose from a test of the daily returns 
surrounding the remaining 126 announcements. If the returns were greater than two 
standard deviations from the mean, the returns were verified using historical copies of 
the Australian Financial Review and historical charts from Commonwealth Securities 
(www.comsec.com.au). The returns surrounding three announcements could not be 
confirmed from these additional sources and were removed from the sample. The 
final filtered sample comprises 123 strategic alliance announcements. Table 1 Panel A 
reports the filtering process detailed above. 
 
[Table 1 in here] 
 
Panel B of Table 1 provides a brief overview of the size (total assets) and market-to-
book value of the firms in the sample. The average firm size is $4.3 billion, the 
smallest firm having $1.2million in total assets. 
Growth (G) is approximated as: 
e tl
ta
MV +BVG=
BV
 
Where: 
MVe = the market value of equity; 
BVtl = the book value of total liabilities; and 
BVta = the book value of total assets. 
 
Generally, firms in the sample are growth firms with an average G of 1.911.  There is 
one firm with a relatively very high G of 13.2, this firm is a high technology firm. 
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The stated motivations of each company contained in the announcement were 
classified according to the type of alliance (Chan et al. 1997).2 Table 2 Panel B shows 
the distribution of alliance type across the sample.3 The different types of alliances are 
generally equally distributed across technology, marketing and R&D. 
 
[Table 2 in here] 
 
Daily share price data were obtained from Thompson’s Financial Data Stream. 
In this study the ASX 300 Accumulation index is used as a proxy for the market.4   
 
b. Method 
Event study methodology of Brown and Warner (1980 and 1985) and 
MacKinlay (1997) is used to analyse the effect of strategic alliances on stock prices.  
To obtain expected returns Bollen, Brooks and Faff (2001) beta estimates are based 
on a 250-day period beginning 20 days prior to each announcement.5  Cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAARs) are computed across 3-day and 5-day event 
windows surrounding the announcement as well as announcement day abnormal 
returns. CAARs for the 3-day event window comprise stock returns for announcement 
day t, t-1 and t+1. CAARs for the 5-day event window comprise stock returns for the 
announcement day, and two days either side of the announcement day.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Although classification error is possible, generally each alliance announcement gave sufficient 
information to determine which type it belonged. 
 
3 Appendix A provides examples of each different type of alliance. 
 
4 This index makes up over 90% of the Australian stock market (Australian Stock Exchange, 2002). 
 
5 A range of different leads and lags were used to calculate beta and abnormal returns. The results are 
insensitive to the different methods used. 
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4. Results 
 
a. The Value Maximisation Hypothesis 
 
The value maximisation hypothesis predicts that the market response to the 
announcement of a strategic alliance will be significantly positive. This study finds 
support for the value maximisation hypothesis. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics 
and results of tests of significance of the CAARs and the announcement day abnormal 
returns from zero. Using the t-test, as defined in Brown and Warner (1985), the 
significant average announcement day abnormal return (BBF0) is 1.4% and the 
significant 3-day CAAR (BBF3) is 1.6%. The cumulative average abnormal return for 
5 days surrounding the announcement (BBF5) is insignificant. The announcement day 
abnormal return (BBF0) is considerably higher than Chan et al (1997) and Gleason et 
al (2003). They both report an announcement day abnormal return of approximately 
0.64%.  
[Table 3 here] 
b. The Knowledge Hypothesis 
 To test the knowledge hypothesis a classification of research and development 
alliances is required. As shown in Table 2, a distribution of the different types of 
alliances in the sample is provided.  To test whether the average abnormal returns for 
these groups differ an ANOVA test (and Kruskal-Wallis on the median abnormal 
returns) is used. Based on the results there is no significant difference in the mean or 
median announcement day abnormal returns for the different types of alliances (F-stat 
= 0.688 (prob=0.601); z-Stat=2.543 (prob=0.637)).6  These results indicate that the 
                                                 
6 Furthermore, average (median) BBF0s from product development or research alliance announcements 
were compared to average (median) BBF0s from the remaining alliances and no significant difference 
was detected. Appendix B provides details of OLS regression results. 
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abnormal returns on the announcement of a strategic alliance are not due to the 
increased knowledge that is expected to accompany them.  
 
c. The Flexibility Hypothesis 
 
To test the flexibility hypothesis a classification of high-technology/low- 
technology is required. There are two elements for this classification. Either the firm 
is from a high technology (high-tech) or low technology (low-tech) industry or the 
alliance is high technology (high-tech) or low technology (low-tech) in nature. Chan 
et al (1997) classify their sample on industry codes. Firms in information technology 
and telecommunications are classified as high-tech and consumer discretionary, 
consumer staple, energy, financials, industrials and utilities are classified as low-tech. 
Finally, the healthcare classification is broken up by its GICS industry group. Firms 
who manufacture healthcare equipment and supplies or provide health care services 
are classified as low-tech. Those firms in healthcare research development or 
biotechnology are classified as high-tech.  
An alliance is classified as a high-tech alliance if it is a research and 
development alliance, where a new innovation or product is being developed. Other 
alliances are classified as low-tech. 
This study views a high-tech project as a project that involves new, advanced 
methods and outputs. A strategic alliance can be classified as high-tech in two ways: 
1. The announcing firm is in a high-tech industry. A high-tech industry 
includes information technology, biotechnology and 
telecommunications. 
2. The alliance is of a high-tech nature by developing new innovative 
products and processes. For example, an alliance for research and 
development.  
  13
The distribution between high/low-tech industry and high/low-tech alliance is detailed 
in Table 4. 
[Table 4 in here] 
 
From Table 4, using the high-tech/low-tech industry and high-tech/low-tech 
alliance 31 of the 119 announcements are classified as in the high-tech industry. Of 
the 119 announcements 36 are classified as high-tech alliances.  
Table 4 indicates that there are not an equal number of alliances across the two 
industry groups. Furthermore, high-tech firms make up approximately 10% of the 
ASX 300 (Standard and Poor’s, 2002), however 26% (31/119) of the sample of 
announcements is from firms in high technology industry. This suggests that strategic 
alliances are more likely from high technology firms. This provides little support for 
the flexibility hypothesis. 
Chan et al (1997) find high-tech alliances earn abnormal returns significantly 
greater than low-tech alliances providing better support for the flexibility hypothesis. 
Tests of the mean and median BBF0s fail to find any significant difference between 
high/low tech industry and high/low tech alliance groups. The results of the ANOVA 
and Kruskal-Wallis tests are provided in Table 5. Table 5 shows that the difference in 
the median announcement day abnormal returns for high-tech and low-tech firms has 
a p-value of 0.093 but this is not regarded as significant. No support is provided from 
the ANOVA tests.7  Generally, these results do not support the view that the driver of 
the announcement day abnormal returns is improved organisational flexibility, even 
though a higher proportion of alliance announcements are from high technology 
firms. 
                                                 
7 Appendix B provides details of OLS regressions. These confirm the lack of support for the flexibility 
hypothesis. 
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[Table 5 in here] 
 
 
c. The Investment Opportunity Hypothesis 
 
If a firm faces positive (negative) net present value projects then the firm has a 
good (bad) opportunity set. If a firm has a good opportunity set it is regarded as a 
growth firm and has a higher market to book value. 
As shown in Panel B of Table 1 sampled firms have an average growth 
measure of 1.911.  To determine if the abnormal returns to strategic alliance 
announcements are different for firms with higher growth relative to firms with lower 
growth, the sample is stratified on the growth measure (G). The results of tests of the 
difference in BBF0 for firms in the top decile and bottom deciles of growth are shown 
in Table 6.  
[Table 6 in here] 
From Table 6 the highest decile of growth firms has a mean growth value of 
just over 5, while the lowest decile of growth firms has a mean growth value of just 
over 0.5. Also shown in Table 6 is the result of tests of difference in mean and median 
BBF0 for the highest and lowest decile growth firms. The difference between mean 
(and median) abnormal announcement day returns for the two groups is significant (t-
stat=5.864; prob-value=0.024). The mean announcement day return for the highest 
decile growth firms is 0.7% (which is insignificantly different from zero) while the 
lowest decile growth firms have a mean announcement day abnormal day return of 
7.3% (which is significantly different from zero). This result shows that low growth 
firms announcing strategic alliances send significant more valuable information to the 
market than high growth firms. Furthermore, the insignificant announcement day 
abnormal return for the higher growth firms implies that the source of abnormal 
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returns from strategic alliance announcements is originating from the lower growth 
firms.8  
As discussed in the literature review the higher (lower) abnormal returns to the 
lower (higher) growth firms may be due to either the hubris or the additional 
information hypotheses. If hubris is the source of the lower abnormal returns to the 
higher growth firms, then firms that have higher free cash flows are expected to have 
lower returns, particularly if they are also higher growth firms. If hubris is not the 
source of the lower returns to the higher growth firms, then free cash flow will not be 
an explanatory factor.   
To test these two hypotheses the sample is initially divided into high and low 
free cash flow firms. The announcement day abnormal returns to the top decile of 
high free cash flow firms are compared to the bottom decile.9  Based on both ANOVA 
and Kruskal-Wallis tests there is no significant difference in mean or median 
abnormal returns for these two groups ((t-stat= 0.039 (p-value=0.968); z-stat= 0.403 
(p-value=0.524)). To further test these hypotheses the top 30 high and bottom 30 low 
growth firms were divided into high and low free cash flow groups. The 
announcement day returns for the top and bottom deciles of highest and lowest free 
cash flow firms are compared for both the high and low growth firm groups. No 
significant difference in announcement day returns for these groups was found.  From 
these results the additional information hypothesis is accepted. The significant 
abnormal day returns observed in the sample of firms announcing strategic alliances is 
                                                 
8 Appendix B provides OLS regression results supporting this conclusion. 
 
9 To reduce problems of scale, free cash flow is divided by total assets. 
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due to additional information on the growth potential of lower growth firms that is 
released to the market on the announcement of a strategic alliance.10 
 
 
5. Summary  
This study documents that for a sample of firms announcing strategic alliances a 
significant average abnormal stock return occurs. A significant cumulative average 
abnormal return persists for three days surrounding the announcement but not for five 
days surrounding the announcement.  
To identify the source of the announcement day abnormal returns a number of 
hypotheses are tested.  The knowledge hypothesis predicts that the source of the gains 
in a strategic alliance announcement is the improved knowledge transfer that 
accompanies them.  There was no evidence from the sample to support the knowledge 
hypothesis.   
The flexibility hypothesis predicts that the gains from strategic alliances are 
due to the improved management flexibility and this should be most evident for firms 
in the higher technology industries.  The sample of strategic alliance announcements 
did show a greater number of strategic alliances in the higher technology industries. 
However, analysis of the abnormal returns did not provide sufficient evidence to 
support this hypothesis. 
The investment opportunity hypothesis incorporates two competing 
hypotheses. The hubris hypothesis predicts that firms with a higher market to book 
value (growth firms) will be discounted on the announcement of a strategic alliance 
because the market believes that the managers of these firms are endowed with excess 
cash and the strategic alliance is not a shareholder wealth maximising decision. This 
                                                 
10 Table B7 in Appendix B provides OLS regression results. These results provide further support for 
the additional information hypothesis. 
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hypothesis is not supported.  There is no significant difference in announcement day 
abnormal returns for higher free cash flow firms relative to lower free cash flow firms 
even after controlling for growth.  The additional information hypothesis predicts that 
the higher growth firms have already signalled to the market their growth potential 
and that the announcement of a strategic alliance is of less value, relative to lower 
growth firms. For lower growth firms their potential has not been released to the 
market and the announcement of a strategic alliance has additional information value. 
The sample of firms in this study showed that the source of significant abnormal 
announcement day returns for strategic alliances originates from lower growth firms. 
In particular, the average announcement day abnormal return for the sample decile of 
higher growth firms is insignificantly from zero. 
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Table 1 The Final Sample of Announcements 
Panel A of this table shows the data filtering criteria for strategic alliance announcements. Stategic 
alliance announcements were collected from the Aspect Financial Dat Analysis database via a word 
search for ‘strategic’ and ‘alliance’ over the period June 1994 to June 2001. Stock price data was 
obtained from Datastream.  
 
Panel B of this table shows descriptive statistics for the firms in the sample. 
 
Panel A 
 
Filtering Process 
Number of 
Announcements 
Remaining 
Sample 
Observations in initial search 1325  
Less: other announcements within 60 days of 
strategic alliance announcement.a  -746 579 
Less: announcements containing insufficient 
information on strategic alliances -298 281 
Less: announcements pertaining to 
subsidiaries -127 154 
Less: announcements by firms that were 
publicly listed within the prior 12 months -28 126 
Less: Return errors -7 119 
   
 a. Additional information not related to the alliance may be price sensitive and thus bias results 
 
Panel B 
Summary statistics of firms in sample. 
Statistic Total Asstets 
($m) 
MV/BV 
 Mean  4,276.6  1.9
 Median  227.5  1.6
 Maximum  53,972.0  13.2
 Minimum  1.2  0.1
 Std. Dev.  9,279.6  1.5
 Skewness  2.7  3.9
 Kurtosis  11.1  27.9
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Table 2 The Distribution of Alliance Types 
This table presents the distribution of alliance types across the sample. Announcements are classified into 
the following groups; technology transfer or systems integration, marketing or distribution, product development 
or research, licensing, and other (Chan et al, 1997). 
 
Alliance Type Number of Announcements Percentage of Sample 
Technology transfer or systems integration 39 33% 
 
Marketing or distribution 35 29% 
Product development or research 34 29% 
Licensing 4 3% 
Other a 7 6% 
Total 119 100% 
   
 
a The classification ‘other’ refers to announcements from which the type was unidentifiable and also 
includes combinations of the other types.  
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Table 3 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) 
This Table shows the descriptive statistics for announcement day abnormal returns and the cumulative 
average abnormal returns from strategic alliance announcements over the following periods: 
• Announcement day abnormal returns (BBF0); 
• Cumulative abnormal returns for the day before, announcement day and day after (BBF3); and  
• Cumulative abnormal returns for five days surrounding announcement day (BBF5). 
 
The Bollen, Brookes and Faff (2001) method is used to calculate expected returns and uses daily data, 
with the market led by 2 days and lagged by 1 to estimate beta.  
 
The t-statistic for the cumulative average abnormal returns is calculated as: 
,
2
t T
BW T
t
t
CAAR
t
n
σ
=
∑
 [Brown and Warner (1985)] 
where 
CAARt,T = The cumulative (or announcement day) average abnormal return over the event window 
from day t to T; 
σ2t   = the variance of the daily abnormal return over the event window from day t to T; and 
n = the number of announcement observations in the sample. 
 
A Jacque-Bera test for normality rejected normality in the CAARs. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
rejected medians from zero with similar p-values as the t-test. 
  
 
CAAR 
 
BBF(0) 
 
BBF(3) 
 
BBF(5) 
Mean 0.014 0.016  0.007 
Median 0.004 0.011  0.007 
Maximum 0.240 0.258  0.315 
Minimum -0.133 -0.297 -0.299 
Std. Dev. 0.056 0.084  0.089 
Skewness 1.118 -0.033 -0.001 
Kurtosis 7.082 5.223  5.393 
    
Jarque-Bera 107.457 24.527  28.411 
Probability 0.000 0.000  0.000 
    
tBW-stat 2.791 2.121 0.800 
p-value 0.006 0.036 0.425 
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Table 4 Announcement Distribution by High-Technology and Low-Technology 
This table shows the sample size for each announcement as classified as one of four combinations of 
technological nature. High-technology/low-technology industry or high-technology/low-technology 
alliance.  
 
  Industry  
 High Tech Low Tech Total 
High Tech 10 26 36 
Low Tech 21 62 83 
Alliance 
Total 31 88 119 
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Table 5 ANOVA Test Results 
This table shows the results of tests of equality of mean (ANOVA) and median (Kruskal-Wallis) for 
different industry/alliance high-tech/low-tech groups.  
Sample size = 119. 
 
 
 
Industry group ANOVA  
F-stat  
(p-value) 
Kruskal Wallis  
Z-stat 
(p-value) 
High tech industry v low tech industry  (n=31,88) 2.537 
(0.114) 
2.812 
(0.093) 
High tech alliance v low tech alliance (n=36,83) 0.021 
(0.885) 
0.070 
(0.790) 
High tech industry and high tech alliance v  
High tech industry and low tech alliance v  
Low tech industry and high tech alliance v  
Low tech industry and low tech alliance (n=10, 21,26,62) 
 
 
 
0.870 
(0.459) 
 
 
 
3.060 
(0.382) 
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Table 6 Test of abnormal announcement day returns for highest and lowest growth firms 
This table reports the results of tests of the investment opportunity hypothesis. Investment opportunity 
is proxied by G where G is defined as: 
 
e tl
ta
M V +BVG=
BV
 
where: 
MVe = the market value of equity; 
BVtl = the book value of total liabilities; and 
BVta = the book value of total assets.  
 
Growth Statistic Value 
Highest decile G Mean G 5.096 
 Mean (BBF0) 0.007 
 Median (BBF0) 0.000 
 Std dev (BBF0) 0.027 
Lowest decile G Mean G 0.547 
 Mean (BBF0) 0.073 
 Median (BBF0) 0.030 
 Std dev (BBF0) 0.090 
t-stat (prob value)  5.864 (0.024) 
Chi-square stat (prob value)  6.000 (0.014) 
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Appendix A: Examples of Strategic Alliance Announcements 
 
This appendix provides examples of each alliance classification. The classifications 
are made in line with Chan et al (1997) as marketing or distribution, technology 
transfer or systems integration, product development or research, licensing and 
other/unknown/combination. 
Table A-1 Examples of announcements 
 
 Marketing or Distribution 2-Aug-2000 
Avatar Industries Limited ("Avatar") announces that its wholly owned 
subsidiary Arlec Australia Limited ("Arlec") has entered into a 
series of agreements establishing strategic alliance with PDL 
Industries Limited ("PDL") one of Australasia's leading manufacturers 
of electrical products and accessories. 
 
Under the terms of the alliance PDL will take over distribution of 
Arlec branded products in New Zealand and the South Pacific and Arlec 
will source and supply PDL with products which it does not 
manufacture for distribution under the PDL brand. PDL will also supply 
Arlec with a range of high quality electrical products and 
accessories manufactured by PDL for distribution under the Arlec 
brand in the Australian retail and hardware market. 
 
 
 
 
Technology Transfer or 
Systems Integration 30-Sep-1999 
ANZ and E*TRADE Australia today announced the formation of a 
strategic alliance to develop Australia's leading on-line share 
trading and investment service. 
 
Part of ANZ's strategy to build a leading position in e-commerce, the 
strategic alliance will involve ANZ and E*TRADE Australia offering 
on-line share trading services to ANZ's 4 million customers in 
Australia and New Zealand. 
 
Under an exclusive arrangement, ANZ and E*TRADE Australia will 
establish a co-branded on-line share trading service to be managed 
by E*TRADE Australia. The ANZ-E*TRADE co-branded service will be 
accessible from ANZ's Internet site, and ANZ will become the 
preferred supplier of banking products and other financial services 
to E*TRADE Australia customers. 
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Product Development or 
Research 17/1/2001 
Ainsworth Game Technology (AGI) and PBL Gaming today announced they 
had reached an agreement for Ainsworth Game Technology to develop 
exclusive games for PBL's Vanuatu-based Internet casino, 
crowngames.com. 
 
Ainsworth Game Technology Chief Executive Officer, Mr Jim O'Mahony, 
said he was pleased with the agreement which provides a strategic 
alliance with PBL's Online gaming arm. 
 
"This agreement allows Ainsworth Game Technology to enter the 
international Internet gaming market through the development of 
exclusive online games for PBL's Internet-based casino," Mr O'Mahony 
said. 
 
 
 
 Licensing 20/2/1996 
Tele-IP (ASX:TEE) is pleased to announce the creation of a strategic 
alliance with Riverstone Networks Inc (NASDAQ:RSTN) in which; 
 
1. Riverstone will acquire patents held by Tele-IP covering global 
positioning by satellite for event timing (GPS Event Timing), Address 
Masquerading and Latency Routing for a consideration of US$2.5M. 
 
2. Riverstone will grant Tele-IP an unrestricted, exclusive and 
irrevocable licence to the above patents except for their application 
in Riverstone Networks manufactured products and products that 
compete with Riverstone Networks manufactured products. 
 
 
 
 Other 09/02/2001 
Leading Australian Internet security providers - SecureNet Limited 
(SNX.AX) and eSign Australia Limited - have formed a strategic 
alliance. The alliance will address the burgeoning market demand for 
highly trusted and internationally certified security services, which 
are now increasingly stipulated for government and finance sectors 
e-commerce applications globally. 
 
The two companies will work together on a number of initiatives that 
will concentrate on the technical integration and co-marketing of 
SecureNet's smart card and security server technologies with eSign's 
Certification Authority (CA) services. Initially, in order to provide 
an end-to-end solution with full gatekeeper accreditation, the 
companies will develop full interoperability, between their public 
key infrastructure (PKI) products. 
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Appendix B: Univariate and Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
This appendix documents regression results for analyses of strategic alliance 
announcement day abnormal returns with a range of different variables. The purpose 
is to test the knowledge, flexibility and investment opportunity hypotheses. 
 
Knowledge hypothesis: 
 
0(0) i iBBF RD eα β= + +          (1) 
where 
BBF(0) = announcement day abnormal return for firm, i; and 
RD = dummy variable equal to 1 if the alliance is product development or 
research, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Table B1 Results of tests of the knowledge hypothesis 
 
Variable Estimates White’s t-
statistic
Prob-value
Constant 0.010 2.096 0.038
RD 0.012 0.92 0.358
F-Statistic 1.217 0.272
Adjusted R2 0.002
 
 
 
 
Flexibility hypothesis: 
 
0(0) i iBBF HTA eα β= + +          (2) 
where  
HTA  = dummy variable equal to 1 if the alliance is high tech in nature, and 0 
otherwise; 
Other variable as previously defined. 
 
Table B2 Results of tests of the flexibility hypothesis 
 
Variable Estimates White’s t-
statistic
Prob-value
Constant 0.013 2.400 0.893
HTA 0.001 0.134 0.018
F-Statistic 0.021 0.885
Adjusted R2 -0.008
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0(0) i iBBF HTI eα β= + +          (3) 
where  
HTI  = dummy variable equal to 1 if the alliance is announced by a firm in a high 
tech industry, and 0 otherwise. 
Other variable as previously defined. 
 
Table B3 Results of further tests of the flexibility hypothesis 
 
Variable Estimates White’s t-
statistic
Prob-value
Constant 0.009 1.757 0.081
HTI 0.018 1.392 0.166
F-Statistic 2.537 0.114
Adjusted R2 0.012
 
 
 
 
1 2 3(0) i i i iBBF HILA LIHA LL eα β β β= + + + +      (4) 
where 
HILA = dummy variable equal to 1 if the alliance is a low tech alliance announced 
by a firm in a high tech industry and 0 otherwise; 
LIHA = dummy variable equal to 1 if the alliance is a high tech alliance announced 
by a firm in a low tech industry and 0 otherwise; and 
LL = dummy variable equal to 1 if the alliance is a low tech alliance announced 
by a firm in a low tech industry and 0 otherwise. 
Other variable as previously defined. 
 
 
Table B4 Results of further tests of the flexibility hypothesis 
 
 
Variable Estimates White’s t-
statistic
Prob-value
Constant 0.032 1.204 0.231
HILA -0.007 -0.236 0.813
LIHA -0.024 -0.824 0.411
LL -0.023 -0.821 0.413
F-Statistic 0.870 0.458
Adjusted R2 -0.003
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Investment opportunity hypothesis: 
 
1 2(0) i i iBBF LOWG HIG eα β β= + + +       (5) 
where 
LOWG = dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcing firm is in the lowest decile of 
growth firms and 0 otherwise; and 
HIG = dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcing firm is in the highest decile of  
growth firms and 0 otherwise. 
Other variable as previously defined. 
 
Table B5 Results of tests of the investment opportunity hypothesis 
 
Variable Estimates White’s t-
statistic
Prob-value
Constant 0.007 1.443 0.151
LOWG 0.065 4.028 0.000
HIG -0.001 -0.046 0.963
F-Statistic 8.237 0.000
Adjusted R2 0.109
 
 
 
1 2 3 4(0) i i i i iBBF LGHF LGLF HGHF HGLF eα β β β β= + + + + +    (6) 
where 
LGHF = dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcing firm has low growth and 
highest decile of free cash flow and zero otherwise; 
LGLF = dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcing firm has low growth and 
lowest decile of free cash flow and zero otherwise; 
HGHF = dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcing firm has high growth and 
highest decile of free cash flow and zero otherwise; 
HGLF = dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcing firm has high growth and 
lowest decile of free cash flow and zero otherwise; and 
Other variable as previously defined. 
 
 
Table B6 Results of tests of the hubris and additional information hypotheses 
 
Variable Estimates White’s t-
statistic
Prob-value
Constant 0.012 2.010 0.046
LGHF 0.008 0.306 0.760
LGLF -0.000 -0.001 0.998
HGHF 0.007 0.636 0.525
HGLF -0.002 -0.251 0.801
F-Statistic 0.117 0.976
Adjusted R2 -0.030
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Knowledge, flexibility and investment opportunity hypotheses: 
 
 
0
1 2 3
4 5
6 7 8 9
(0)
                  
                  
                  
i
i i i
i i
i i i i i
BBF RD
HILA LIHA LL
LOWG HIG
LGHF LGLF HGHF HGLF e
α β
β β β
β β
β β β β
= + +
+ + + +
+ + +
+ + + + +
    
(7) 
where 
Variables as previously defined. 
 
 
Table B7 Results of tests of the knowledge, flexibility and investment opportunity (hubris and 
additional information) hypotheses 
 
 
Variable Estimates White’s t-
statistic
Prob-value
Constant 0.004 0.159 0.873
RD 0.027 1.376 0.171
HILA 0.010 0.381 0.703
LIHA -0.020 -0.774 0.440
LL 0.000 0.022 0.981
LOWG 0.080 3.000 0.003
HIG -0.018 -1.382 0.169
LGHF -0.029 -1.215 0.227
LGLF -0.014 -0.904 0.367
HGHF 0.019 1.287 0.200
HGLF 0.008 0.721 0.472
F-Statistic 2.526 0.008
Adjusted R2 0.114
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Table B8 Correlation matrix of independent variables in equation (7) 
 
 RD HILA LIHA LL LOWG HIG LGHF LGLF HGHF HGLF 
RD 1.000          
           
HILA -0.244 1.000         
t-stat -2.721          
p-value 0.007          
           
LIHA 0.611 -0.245 1.000        
t-stat 8.347 -2.731         
p-value 0.000 0.007         
           
LL -0.511 -0.483 -0.551 1.000       
t-stat -6.425 -5.963 -7.150        
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000        
           
LOWG -0.026 0.138 -0.042 -0.070 1.000      
t-stat -0.286 1.505 -0.455 -0.758       
p-value 0.775 0.135 0.650 0.450       
           
HIG 0.035 0.065 0.026 -0.070 -0.112 1.000     
t-stat 0.382 0.700 0.276 -0.758 -1.221      
p-value 0.703 0.485 0.783 0.450 0.225      
           
LGHF -0.026 0.138 -0.042 -0.070 0.444 -0.112 1.000    
t-stat -0.286 1.505 -0.455 -0.758 5.359 -1.221     
p-value 0.775 0.135 0.650 0.450 0.000 0.225     
           
LGLF -0.026 -0.082 0.026 0.098 0.166 -0.112 -0.112 1.000   
t-stat -0.286 -0.888 0.276 1.061 1.820 -1.221 -1.221    
p-value 0.775 0.376 0.783 0.291 0.071 0.225 0.225    
           
HGHF 0.035 -0.009 0.026 -0.014 -0.112 0.444 -0.112 -0.112 1.000  
t-stat 0.382 -0.093 0.276 -0.152 -1.221 5.359 -1.221 -1.221   
p-value 0.703 0.926 0.783 0.879 0.225 0.000 0.225 0.225   
           
HGLF -0.026 0.065 -0.042 -0.070 -0.112 0.444 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 1.000 
t-stat -0.286 0.700 -0.455 -0.758 -1.221 5.359 -1.221 -1.221 -1.221  
p-value 0.775 0.485 0.650 0.450 0.225 0.000 0.225 0.225 0.225  
 
Due to the highly significant correlations (and potential multicollinearity) between 
variable RD and HILA, LIHA and LL, regression equation (7) was re-run excluding 
variables HILA, LIHA and LL. The low growth variable (LOWG) remained highly 
significant. As results are not sufficiently different from that reported in Table B7 
they are not reported again. The regression was also re-run excluding the variables 
LGHF and HGHF. The low growth variable (LOWG) again remained highly 
significant. Similarly these results are not reported. 
